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Judicial Control of Secret Agents
Society has never taken pride in its secret agents; informers, like
hangmen, are despised in the worthiest of causes. And if an individual
spy is unsavory, the threat of an informer state arouses deeper disquiet.'
Nevertheless, society tolerates the police spy. Necessity is held to require
that "artifice and stratagem may be employed to catch those engaged
in criminal enterprises."2 The detection of consensual crimes would
be all but impossible without the use of traps, decoys and deception.
But though the use of spies may sometimes be proper, such tactics
should be controlled. Even in the most necessitous of cases the end has
been used to justify the means, and the argument that "society is at
war with the criminal classes" can clearly be abused.3
Yet to date the law has limited the police spy only by the defense of
entrapment.4 While widely recognized, this doctrine is ineffectual as a
curb on the secret agent. It is available only to control government
1. The nineteenth-century English historian Sir Erskine May expressed tile popular
view:
Next in importance to personal freedom is immunity from suspicions and jealous
observation. Men may be without restraints upon their liberty; they may pass to and
fro at pleasure; but if their steps are tracked by spies and informers, their words
noted down for crimination, their associates watched as conspirators-who shall say
that they are free? Nothing is more revolting to Englishmen than the espionage which
forms -part of the administrative system of continental despotisms. It haunts men like
an evil genius, chills their gayety, restrains their wit, casts a shadow over their
friendships, and blights their domestic hearth. The freedom of a country may be
measured by its immunity from this baleful agency.
2 E. MAY, CONsTTuTIoNAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 275 (1863).
2. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 441 (1932).
3. The classic statement of the caution with which slight inroads on the privacy of the
individual must be viewed is that of Justice Bradley in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S.
616, 635 (1886):
It may be that it is the obnoxious thing in its mildest and least repulsive form;
but illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first footing in that way,
namely: by silent approaches and slight deviations from legal modes of procedure.
4. See Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958); Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S.
435 (1932). But cf. Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 295 (1921) (search by deception). The
future effectiveness if not the past activities of informers is also reduced to the extent the
police are compelled to disclose their identities. Compare Roviaro v. United States, 353
U.S. 53 (1957) with McCray v. Illinois, 35 U.S.L.W. 4261 (U.S. 1967). This note will
examine only the activities of spies and informers as participants in the criminal law
process; the problems presented by police eavesdropping by mechanical devices (and the
ancillary problems created when secret agents use recording or transmitting devices)
will not be considered.




solicitation of crimes and does not reach passive undercover activities
such as spying or subverting friends.0 Moreover, the current entrap-
ment doctrine allows the police complete freedom to choose targets for
criminal solicitation, with or without reason for suspicion, since the
secret agent's proposition can be justified post hoc by the "ready com-
plaisance" of the target.7
Because of the Supreme Court's recent enthusiasm for policing the
police," many observers forecast a reevaluation of the traditional per-
missive approach when certiorari was granted last year on three peti-
tions involving secret agents.9 Such, however, was not to be the case.
6. Moreover, the doctrine controls active solicitations but poorly. As formulated by
the two leading Supreme Court cases, the defense suffers from a sorry ambivalence as to
whether the doctrine functions to control police tactics or to protect defendants who in
some inarticulate sense are not culpable for their crimes. Thus, in Sherman v. United
States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958), the Court followed the test laid down in Sorrells v. United
States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932), to conclude:
"[W]hen the criminal design originates with the officials of the Government, and
they implant in the mind of an innocent person the disposition to commit the
alleged offense and induce its commission . . . " then stealth and strategy become
as objectionable police methods as the coerced confession and the unlawful search.
356 U.S. at 372, quoting from 287 U.S. at 442.
But since the majority test is balanced by an inquiry into "whether [the defendant]
was already predisposed to commit the act," 356 US. at 371, police methods however
improper cannot alone establish the defense of entrapment. Practically, the question
whether the criminal design originated with the police or their target is usually an im-
possible conundrum, particularly since the parties' testimony is often poles apart. Logi-
cally, the relevance of the origin of intent to the guilt of the accused is puzzling, since
he has voluntarily committed the offense. This is especially so because the defense is not
available if the criminal design originated not with the police but with another private
party. Henderson v. United States, 237 F.2d 169, 175 (5th Cir. 1956) (collecting cases).
Strong concurring opinions in both Sherman and Sorrells argued that the Court should
focus exclusively on police conduct. 356 U.S. at 378 (Frankfurter, J., with Douglas, Harlan
and Brennan, JJ.); 287 U.S. at 453-54 (Roberts, J., with Brandeis and Stone, JJ.). Com-
mentators have also advocated that the function of the defense as a device to control
police activities should be clarified. See generally Donnelly, judicial Control of In-
formants, Spies, Stool Pigeons and Agent Provocateurs, 60 YALE LJ. 1091 (1951); Mikell,
The Doctrine of Entrapment in the Federal Courts, 90 U. PA. L. REv. 245 (1942); Roten-
berg, The Police Detection Practice of Encouragement, 49 U. VA. L REv. 871 (1963);
Comment, Administration of the Affirmative Trap and the Doctrine of Entrapment: Device
and Defense, 31 U. C-m L. REv. 137 (1963); Note, Entrapment, 73 HAnV. L. RE'. 1333
(1960). The authors of the ALI Model Penal Code have moved in the 1962 draft to a
formulation of the defense embodying an objective test for the defendant which would
allow the court to focus on police conduct, after proposing the conventional subjective test
in 1959 with an alternative formulation based on an objective test. Compare MoDEs.
PENAL CODE § 2.13(1) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962) with MODEL PEIAl. CODE § 2.10 (Tent.
Draft No. 9, 1959).
7. See Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. at 375. At least one author has argued for an
expansion of the doctrine -to include a requirement that "the police.., have reasonable
grounds for suspecting such [criminal] conduct . . . before they engage in solicitation."
Note, The Serpent Beguiled Me and I Did Eat: The Constitutional Status of the Entrap-
ment Defense, 74 YA.E L.J. 942, 952 (1964).
8. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478
(1964); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
9. Hoffa v. United States, 382 U.S. 1024 (1966); Lewis v. United States, 382 U.S. 1024
(1966); Osborn v. United States, 382 U.S. 1023 (1966).
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Hoffa, Osborn & Lewis
The decisions handed down last December in Hoffa v. United
States,10 Osborn v. United States"and Lewis v. United States12 imposed
no limitations whatever on the use of police spies. The convictions
were upheld in each case, and the Court employed such open-ended
reasoning that almost any tactics could be justified under one or more
of the opinions.'3
The Hoffa case arose out of the efforts by the Teamster president and
his co-defendants to tamper with the jury during his 1962 trial in Nash-
ville on charges related to misuse of union funds. The petitioners 4
argued that their Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights had been
violated by the activities of one Edward Grady Partin, the chief govern-
ment witness and the only witness linking Hoffa to the attempted
bribes."; They claimed the Government had deceptively placed Partin
in their midst to collect evidence; the Government refused to concede
that it had "'placed' the informer anywhere, much less that it did so
'deceptively.' ,,8 While Justices Clark and Douglas would have ac-
cepted the findings of the lower courts that Partin had not been placed
in the defendants' camp,17 the majority led by Mr. Justice Stewart
found a resolution of this "verbal controversy" unnecessary to a deci-
sion of the constitutional issues.' 8
The parties did not disagree except in detail concerning the chain
of events which brought Partin to Nashville and his activities there.10
Partin met Hoffa in Nashville on the first day of the 1962 trial with
the best wishes and admitted foreknowledge of the Government;
whether he could be said to have been "placed" there seems, as the
Court felt, principally a question of semantics. Several weeks before
he had been languishing in a Baton Rouge jail on a charge of kidnap-
ping. At the time he was also under a 26-count Federal indictment for
10. 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
11. 585 U.S. 323 (1966).
12. 385 U.S. 206 (1966).
13. Aside from the porous limitations of the conventional entrapment defense, the
inadequacies of which have already been discussed. See note 6 supra.
14. This note will discuss only the issues in their relation to Hoffa; his co-defendants
faced difficult problems of standing which were not discussed by the Court in view of
its rejection of Hoffa's claims. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. at 300.
15. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 296, Brief for Petitioner at 5.
16. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 295.
17. Id. at 322. Clark and Douglas would accordingly have dismissed the writs of
certiorari as improvidently granted.
18. Id. at 295.
19. The Court's description of the underlying facts appears at 385 U.S. at 296-99. The
statements of the parties appear in the Brief for Petitioner at 3-23 and Brief for the
United States at 3-60.
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embezzling the funds of his Teamster local, and under state indict-
ments for manslaughter, perjury and assault.20 After recounting to his
turnkey an alleged plot by Hoffa to assassinate Robert F. Kennedy,
then Attorney General, he not only told the federal agents who rapidly
appeared the details of the conspiracy, but also volunteered, as a close
personal friend of Hoff-a, to inform them of any illegal activities at
Hoffa's forthcoming trial.2 Partin was subsequently released on bail
and the Government requested a continuance on the Federal indict-
ment; during the next days he made calls to Hoffa-recorded by the
state-and invited himself to meet his friend in Nashville to talk over
problems.22
Once in Nashville, Partin reported his arrival as he had been in-
structed to Valter J. Sheridan, the non-lawyer "special consultant" to
the Attorney General who headed the organization popularly known as
the Get Hoffa Task Force.23 Partin thereafter became a court retainer
in the Hoffa entourage; by "constantly hanging around" in the Team-
ster suite where he "got people ashtrays, moved chairs and acted as
doorman," he overheard incriminating conversations which he reported
daily to Sheridan.
24
Partin received no money directly for these services, although $1,200
in support payments were made to his wife from government funds.2
More significantly, perhaps, the federal and state charges against him
were either dropped or not actively pursued-although the Govern-
ment argued there was no necessary connection between this and his
activities.26
The Court found no hint of a denial of constitutional rights in these
activities. While the majority opinion by Stewart acknowledged that
"there have been sharply differing views within the Court as to the
ultimate reach of the Fifth Amendment right against compulsory
self-incrimination,"2 7 the Court curtly rejected Hoffa's claims since
his incriminating statements were not "the product of any sort of coer-
cion, legal or factual.''
In dismissing Hoffa's claim that Partin's evidence had been obtained
20. Brief for Petitioner at 5.
21. Id. at 6-7.
22. Id. at 7-8.
23. See, e.g., Cook, Anything to Get Hofa, 204 NAXoN 230 (1967); Su)dam, Hoifa:
How They Nailed Him, Life, Mar. 13, 1964, at 20.
24. Brief for Petitioner at 9-20.
25. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 298.
26. Id.; see also Brief for the United States at 55-58.
27. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 303.
28. Id. at 304.
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in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights, the Court agreed with
the premises of his argument: a hotel room can be a constitutionally
protected area;29 guileful as well as forcible intrusions may violate the
amendment;30 and the protection of the amendment extends to oral
statements. 31 But, said Stewart, the petitioners misunderstood the
"fundamental nature and scope" of the Fourth Amendment, which
protects only "the security a man relies upon when he places himself
or his property within a constitutionally protected area .... ,,32 Because
Partin "was in the suite by invitation, and every conversation which
he heard was either directed to him or knowingly carried on in his
presence," Hoffa was obviously "not relying on the security of the hotel
room; he was relying upon his misplaced confidence that Partin would
not reveal his wrongdoing."33
Justices Fortas and White did not sit in the case. Chief Justice
Warren, in dissent, argued that the Court should have exercised its
supervisory powers over the federal courts to reverse the convictions
because of the distastefulness and "serious potential for undermining
the ... truth-finding process" of the Government's undercover tactics.8 4
In Osborn v. United States,8 an attorney of "impeccable reputa-
tion" 38 stood convicted of jury tampering.8 The evidence consisted of
the testimony and tape recordings of a man named Robert Vick who
29. United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951).
30. Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921).
31. Silverman v. United States, 565 U.S. 505 (1961).
32. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 501.
33. Id. at 302. The Court also denied two claims under the Sixth Amendment. The
first was that Hoffa's right to the effective assistance of counsel was interfered with when
Partin reported the conversations of the defense attorneys that he had overheard. The
Court found that even upon the assumption that a "surreptitious invasion" by a govern-
ment agent into the legal camp of the defense would have invalidated a conviction in the
1962 Nashville trial (which actually ended with a hung jury), the 1964 trial was unaffected
since the "incriminating statements ... in this case were totally unrelated in both time
and subject matter to any assumed intrusion by Partin into the conferences of the
petitioner's counsel in the [Nashville] trial." Id. at 306-09. The second claim was based on
the assertion that the Government had probable cause to justify Hoffa's arrest relatively
early inits investigation. Hence, the petitioner argued, the failure of the police to arrest
him and thereupon follow the rules laid down in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964),
resulted in a denial of his right to counsel. The Court was stunned at the claim of a
right to be arrested. 385 U.S. at 310. Hoffa also made a final plea that the police tactics
employed against him, even if no specific constitutional rights were violated, constituted
a denial of due process in offending the "canons of decency and fairness . . . of the
English-speaking peoples," Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952). 885 U.S. at
310-11. The Court's canons, however, were not offended.
34. 385 U.S. at 320.
35. 385 U.S. 323 (1966).
56. The description is that of the Government brief. Brief for the United States at 26,
Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323 (1966). Among other professional accomplishments,
Mr. Osborn argued for the successful appellants in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
37. The case arose out of a later Hoffa trial following the 1962 trial which ended In
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had applied for and obtained a job investigating prospective jurors;
unbeknownst to lawyer Osborn, Vick had already agreed to report
to the government any "illegal activities."3 Is The two inevitably differed
in their versions of who proposed what to whom for how long, but at
length Vick was ready to swear to an affidavit that Osborne was a
budding juror briber. The Government asked for and obtained from
a district judge authorization to equip its agent with a Minifon record-
ing device. The Minifon "did not operate properly" on Vick's next
visit to the defendant's office, but ultimately did record several highly
incriminating statements.30
The Court, with Stewart again writing for the majority, upheld the
district court authorization of the Minifon as a proper means to avoid
"a testimonial contest,"4 0 and rejected the claim that the entrapment
defense was established as a matter of law.41
In Lewis v. United States,42 a Government agent had telephoned the
petitioner to ask to purchase narcotics. Lewis had invited the agent
to his home and sold him, in two transactions, eleven bags of mari-
huana. After his conviction Lewis did not claim entrapment, "as he
could not on the facts of [the] case." 43 Moreover, his counsel conceded
at oral argument that after the phone call, at least,4 4 the Government
had probable cause to justify the issuance of a search warrant.45 The
narrow claim presented was that "in the absence of a warrant, any
official intrusion upon the privacy of a home constitutes a Fourth
Amendment violation and that the fact that the suspect invited the
intrusion cannot be held a waiver when the invitation was induced
by fraud and deception." The Court made short work of it. Chief
Justice Warren concluded confidently for the majority that since the
house had been converted to a "commercial center" by the two nar-
cotics sales proven, it was no longer a "home" but had become a
"business" entitled to no constitutional protection. 0
In short, having broached the subject anew in Hoffa, Osborn and
a hung jury. Aside from an overlap in some of the bit players, such as the ubiquitous
Walter J. Sheridan, the Osborn case was not related to Hoffa.
38. 385 U.S. at 325.
39. Id. at 325-27, 329.
40. Id. at 330.
41. Id. at 331.
42. 385 U.S. 206 (1966).
43. Id. at 208.
44. The agent apparently "suspected" the defendant before calling him, but the
Government was not permitted to show at the trial the nature of and grounds for this
suspicion. Brief for the United States at 3 n.1.
45. Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 208-09 hA.
46. Id. at 211.
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Lewis, the Supreme Court once again approved the virtually unre-
strained use of secret agents:
(1) a spy or informer may be employed against a person although
there is neither probable cause nor even reasonable suspicion that lie
has committed, is engaged in, or is about to engage in a criminal course
of conduct;
47
(2) the agent may be a close personal friend of the target, a busi-
ness associate or a stranger;
48
(3) the agent may carry on his clandestine activities without any
limits of time or place.
49
The Court's carte blanche for police spying would have been sur-
prising under any circumstances. But it came as an especially unex-
pected sequel to Miranda, where open and acknowledged police
questioning was brought under rigid control. Unrestrained use of
informers, no less than uncontrolled station-house interrogation and
police searches, can place Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights in
jeopardy. The practices are not, of course, identical. But even if the
Fifth Amendment privilege should for practical reasons be limited to
the police station, as this note will ultimately conclude, the similarities
between deceptive interrogation and undercover tactics dictate some
measure of judicial control over spying. The close relationship of
certain undercover tactics to the searches and seizures regulated by the
Fourth Amendment leads to both a rationale and an effective means
for such control.
Secret Agents and Self-Incrimination
Hoffa and Osborn were both convicted by testimony "out of their
own mouths." If admissions such as theirs have never been thought
fit subjects for Fifth Amendment coverage, neither arguably were
police station confessions before Miranda. As late as 1964, the Court
felt obliged to obscure its ultimate plans for the Fifth Amendment
with a narrow holding that the accused upon his request must be
47. The Government's reasons to suspect Hoffa and Lewis are, at best, not clear,
against Osborn there were no grounds for suspicion whatever.
48. "Partin had known Hoffa closely since 1957 [and] had dealt with him on many
occasions on union business and on personal matters. ... Brief for the United States It
21, Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
49. As to time, Partin carried on his activities over a period of two months, reporting
daily when he was in Nashville. As to place, Hofja and Lewis together open the home
to virtually all undercover agents: if the agent is a friend, he enters by "invitation"; If a
stranger enters to engage in an unlawful business transaction, the home has become
a "commercial center."
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allowed to consult his lavyer. 0 Two years later the Court acknowl-
edged that the Escobedo requirement of counsel at interrogation was
merely a protective device and set about straight-forwardly "applying
the privilege against self-incrimination to in-custody interrogation."a'
The elaborate procedural safeguards fashioned by Airanda52 can
partially be explained as simply an escalation of the Court's long
drive to end coercion in the station house. 3 Although beatings are
apparently a rarity today,5" long experience has taught that judges
can never know what actually happened in the interrogation room.
Moreover, the Court was plainly frustrated by the difficulties of its
case-by-case search for psychological coercion. As the majority re-
peatedly stressed, the "compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings"
is always present in some degree but never measurable on a cold
record.56
But, as Mr. Justice Harlan insisted in dissent," even the travails
of case-by-case analysis could not justify the majority's rigid curbs on
the police-if the decision's only target was coercion. High-pressure
tactics could be stopped by clamping a time-limit on police questioning
and making interrogation visible to outside observers, as was proposed
in the American Law Institute's Model Pre-Arraignment Code. But
50. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 US. 478, 490-91 (1954).
51. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 441 (1966).
52. The Court summarized its pre-arraignment code as follows:
[U]nless other fully effective means are devised to inform accused persons of their
right of silence and to assure a continuous opportunity to exercise it, the following
measures are required. Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that
he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as
evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either
retained or appointed. The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided
the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligenty. If, however, he indicates
in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an
attorney before speaking there can be no questioning. Likewise, if the individual is
alone and indicates in any manner that he does not wish to be interrogated, the
police may not question him. The mere facts that he may have answered some ques-
tions or volunteered some statements on his own does not deprive him of the right
to refrain from answering any further inquiries until he has consulted with an
attorney and thereafter consents to be questioned.
Id. at 444-45.
53. See generally Herman, The Supreme Court and Restrictions on Police Interroga-
tions, 25 OHIO ST. LJ. 449 (1964); Developments in the Law: Confession, 79 HAv. I.
REv. 935 (1966); Comment, The Coerced Confession Cases in Search of a Rationale, 31
U. Cm. L. REv. 313 (1964).
54. The Court buttressed its Miranda opinion with citations-many dated, a few more
recent-of actual police brutality, 384 U.S. at 446 nn.6 & 7, but stressed that "die modern
practice of in-custody interrogation is psychologically rather than ph)sically oriented,"
id. at 448.
55. See id. at 445, 448, 461.
56. Id. at 458. See also id. at 461, 465, 467.
57. Id. at 506 (dissenting opinion of Harlan, J.).
58. See ALI, A MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMEIr PROCEDURE, Artides 4, 5 (rent. Draft
No. 1, 1966). It could be argued that the Court could not itself enact such a code of
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Miranda aimed at more than an end to compulsion; it sought to
guarantee the defendant the right not to speak at all.
In establishing the affirmative right of an accused to stand silent
in the police station, the Court joined two converging lines of cases.
The state confession cases had found coercion with increasing fre-
quency;59 by 1963, it was "coercive" for the police to refuse to allow
the accused to call his wife until he confessed.00 Indeed, in extending
the Fifth Amendment to the States in Malloy v. Hoganol the Court
relied on these due process precedents as evidence of "the right of a
person to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered
exercise of his own will .... 02
But endless rummaging for evidence of "coercion" in the state cases
never produced a rationale for the right to stand silent the Court was
slowly extending to suspects. The privilege against self-incrimination
provided this rationale. Although the privilege historically was at best
questionably related to the confession doctrine,03 the Court began to
reason in Massiah v. United States"4 that the right to remain mute
in court is meaningless if the accused can be induced to incriminate
himself before trial. In Massiah a co-defendant, collaborating with the
police, placed a transmitting device under the seat of his car before
engaging Massiah in an incriminating conversation. The Court
avoided Massiah's Fourth Amendment claims by reversing for a denial
of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Mr. Justice Stewart rea-
soned for the majority that since Massiah had already been indicted,
the tactics of the Government in eliciting incriminating statements
from him in the absence of his retained attorney had denied him
"effective representation by counsel at the only stage when legal aid
and advice would help him."65 Commentators had great difficulty
imagining what "aid and advice" an equally unsuspecting attorney
would have given Massiah, 0 but the rationale of the Court began to
criminal procedure, but in view of the "procedural safeguards" set forth in Miranda this
point is debatable. The Court could certainly have adopted the essence of the ALI pro-
posals without venturing significantly further.
59. See sources-cited note 53 supra.
60. Haynes v. Washington, 378 U.S. 503, 514 (1963).
61. 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
62. Id. at 8.
63. See 8 J. WIGTAoRE, EVIDENCE § 2266 (McNaughton rev. 1961) [hereinafter cited as
WICMORE.
64. 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
65. Id. at 204, quoting concurring opinion in Spano v. United States, 360 U.S. 315, 926
(1959).
66. See, e.g., Enker & Elsen, Counsel for the Suspect: Massiah v. United States and
Escobedo v. Illinois, 49 MINN. L. Ray. 47, 53-57 (1964).
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emerge in Escobedo. The majority there held that an interrogation
was no less "critical" a stage of the process than the period after in-
dictment, since allowing the state to elicit a confession from the
suspect "would make the trial no more than an appeal from the
interrogation." 67
Finally, in Miranda the merely instrumental role of counsel was
conceded.68 The majority's use of the "critical stage" analysis of
Massiah and Escobedo to extend the Fifth Amendment to the police
station makes vividly clear that the Miranda rules were not designed
simply to protect the suspect from "compulsion" in even the most
attentuated meaning of that word, but to provide concrete "assurance
of real understanding and intelligent exercise of the privilege of
silence." 69
Even a narrow reading of Miranda presents implications for the
use of secret agents to secure incriminating statements. The Court
stressed the inherently coercive atmosphere of the police station in
Miranda, but while this may well be an important consideration in
many confession cases, the "deceptive stratagems" and "psychological
ploys" also condemned by the Court7° depend little or not at all on
bright lights and straight-backed chairs. Danny Escobedo, forewarned
by his lawyer to keep silent, was cracked less than three hours after
his arrest when the police presented him with a false accusation and
tricked him into admitting his complicity by accusing his friend of the
murder.71 Escobedo, a seasoned veteran of the interrogation room,2-
may or may not have been intimidated by the "police-dominated
atmosphere," but one cannot help suspecting that he would have
blurted out the same damning rebuttal to a policeman on the street
or an undercover agent on a bar stool. Even if the "coercive atmo-
sphere" of the interrogation room contributes to the effectiveness of
67. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 486.87 (1964). In the process the majority lost Mr.
Justice Stewart, who had written the majority opinion in Messiah but who thought the
time of indictment an eminently sensible place to draw the line. Id. at 493-95 (dissenting
opinion of Stewart, J.).
68. The Court in Miranda made explicit the role of counsel as a "protective device
necessary to make the process of police interrogation conform to the dictates of the
privilege [against self-incrimination]." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 466 (1966).
69. Id. at 469. The Court's opinion was in fact laced with talk of "the knowing and
intelligent waiver required to relinquish constitutional rights." Id. at 492; see also
id. at 460, 465, 475, 480. Cf. Tehan v. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 414-16 (1966).
70. Miranda v. Arizona, 584 U.S. at 455, 457.
71. People v. Escobedo, 28 Ill. 2d 41, 43, 190 N.E.2d 825, 826 (1963); cf. Escobedo v.
Illinois, 378 US. 478, 479-83 (1954).
72. The police had already interrogated Escobedo several times about the crime
vithout success. People v. Escobedo, 28 II. 2d 41, 43, 190 N.E.2d 825, 826 (1963); cf.
Escobedo v. Illinois, 578 US. 478, 479 (1964).
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the ploys condemned by the Court in recent years, such stratagems
should be found equally objectionable when they succeed by simple
deception outside the police station.
Jimmy Hoffa may have had a weak claim of coercion since Partin
had merely overheard rather than actively elicited the incriminating
statements.7 But Hoffa was deceived: he had no knowledge that his
friend was acting as an informer. The trickery was not so qualitatively
different from the sort of deception found to constitute coercion in
the confession cases as to justify the Supreme Court's glib conclusion
that no "coercion, legal or factual" was involved.74 If the crucial
difference was the quantum of deception or "coercion," or in the fact
that Hoffa was tricked in his hotel room rather than in the police
station, those distinctions should have been explained.
Distinguishing confessions from incriminating statements obtained
by secret agents becomes even more difficult where the agent solicits
the commission of the crime. In Osborn the government spy made at
least an overture toward crime even if, as he claimed,7 5 he only men-
tioned that he knew personally some of the prospective jurors. The
suggestion that this innocent statement represented anything but
dangled bait would be naive. Moreover, and perhaps more impor-
tantly, Osborn claimed that Vick not only suggested the bribe attempt,
but badgered and cajoled him into acquiescence .7  Under the entrap-
ment doctrine the Court considered this a question of fact for resolu-
tion by the jury. But it was precisely such questions of fact that the
Court in Miranda concluded were impossible of resolution by even
the trial judge. If the privacy of the police station inevitably "results
in a gap in our knowledge as to what in fact goes on in interrogation
rooms," 77 the privacy in which spies work certainly leaves a far wider
gap. And if Miranda and Escobedo "reflect a deep-seated distrust of
law enforcement officers,"78 the Justices must certainly view with even
more suspicion the typical undercover hireling.7 9 The question of self-
incrimination was not considered in Osborn. But on almost any ver-
73. Partin had asked some questions, Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 296.97 n,3
(1966), but even on his version of the events they do not seem to have been significant
or notably successful; see Brief for the United States at 14-20.
74. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 304.
75. Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 326 (1966).
76. Id. at 331.
77. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 448.
78. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 499 (dissenting opinion of White, J.).
79. Partin's qualifications for government work have already been briefly mentioned;
see text accompanying notes 19-22 supra. For a good summary of Vick's dubious cre-
dentials, see Brief for Petitioner at 6-7, 14-16, Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323 (1966).
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sion of the facts the Court would have had difficulty distinguishing the
coercion found in appeals to friendship,80 psychological pressuress or
simple persistence in the confession cases.
Secret agents became especially apt targets for Fifth Amendment
limitation under the court's "critical stage" analysis, which aims to
preserve the defendant's rights at trial. For if the substantive right
to stand mute in the courtroom is to be protected in the interrogation
room, the same reasoning compels the protection of the right outside
the police station. Mr. Justice Harlan pointed this out in his dissent,s2
and the majority itself tacitly recognized that it had a headless monster
running loose by constantly stressing that its decision was limited to
in-custody interrogation. The significance of arrest for the right to
silence, however, is as dubious as the formal indictment emphasized
in Massiah and abandoned in Escobedo. Indeed Massiah, where the
Court first used its "critical stage" analysis, did not involve the "police-
dominated atmosphere" of the interrogation room at all; the spy
technique under review in that case was identical to the practices
approved in Hofa and Osborn.
Incriminating statements collected by a spy or informer can "affect
the whole trial" as decisively as a confession made in the police station.
If the privilege is to be preserved by demanding "the knowing and
intelligent waiver required to relinquish constitutional rights," the
requirement should logically encompass the entire investigatory
process. And however one may measure the deception practiced in
Hoifa and Osborn, none of the defendants could be considered to have
made a "knowing and intelligent waiver" while unaware that he was
talking to a secret agent.
The Supreme Court did not explore-or even mention-these issues
in Hoffa. Instead it fled to "legal coercion" as a conclusory term of
art. Had it faced the necessary task of showing why the Fifth Amend-
ment should apply to custodial interrogation but not to secret agents,
it would have found the going rough but not unmanageable. Differ-
ences do exist between the activities of police secret agents and inter-
rogation. These differences show that the stationhouse door can be
justified as a sensible if not ideal stopping point.
First, physical coercion has traditionally been considered an evil of
80. See Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959) (a police officer who was a bo)hood
friend told the defendant he might lose his job unless the defendant confessed).
81. See Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961) (the police persuaded the sus-
pect's wife to exhort him to confess if he was guilty).
82. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 514 (dissenting opinion of Harlan, J.).
1005
The Yale Law Journal
graver proportion than deception. The police station is a more likely
setting for such coercion than the outside world where spies and in-
formers operate. While coercion was not the Court's sole concern in
Miranda, the threat of coercion partly justifies its decision to place
uniquely strict controls on stationhouse activities.
Necessity provides a second basis for distinguishing interrogation
from spying. While interrogation may be important in a significant
fraction of cases in every category of crime, it is not absolutely essen-
tial for any particular category. If the isolated cases made unsolvable
by the Miranda rules are evenly spread among all categories of crime,
the Miranda rules will not render law enforcement impossible in any
single area.
The necessity for spies and informers, on the other hand, is heavily
concentrated in specific categories of crime. Without secret agents,
consensual offenses and organized crime would be virtually beyond
the reach of enforcement officials. Since extending the Fifth Amend-
ment to spies and informers would destroy their utility altogether,
the result would be to make whole categories of crimes undeterrable.80
The Court's special interest in police questioning may also be due
to the fact that its subjects are often the most easily intimidated mem-
bers of society. Miranda and Escobedo reflect a pragmatic concern for
the poor and uneducated members of minority groups. And if the
Court considered Danny Escobedo and Ernesto Miranda representa-
tive visitors to the interrogation room, it may have thought Jimmy
Hoffa and Tommy Osborn typical targets of the secret agent. Spies
and informers may well be most frequently used against experienced
criminals and relatively sophisticated suspects, who can most easily
insulate themselves from ordinary investigatory tactics.
Each of these considerations may have affected the Court's decision
to extend the Fifth Amendment no farther than arrest. Yet none pro-
vides a satisfying constitutional rationale. A more promising approach
would begin with an examination of the relationship between the
Fifth and Fourth Amendments.
Constitutional authorities long ago discovered 4 that the ultimate
83. An interesting aspect of the Hoffa and Osborn cases is that while many would
argue that the enforcement of sumptuary legislation in such areas as narcotics and con-
sensual sex offenses can and should be made impossible, few would suggest a similar
abandonment of the effort to preserve the deterrent effect of laws against jury tampering.
Whether even such laws are worth the cost of enforcement by undercover tactics Is
quite another question.
84. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886); see also Malloy v. Hogan, 878
U.S. 1, 8-9 (1964).
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objectives of both the Fourth and Fifth Amendments are intertwined
if not identical. "Like the constitutional barrier to unreasonable
searches," as Judge Jerome Frank observed, the privilege against self-
incrimination functions "as a safeguard of the individual's 'substan-
tive' right of privacy, a right to a private enclave where he may lead
a private life."8 5 But this perception leaves unexplained the difference
between the qualified privilege against unreasonable searches and the
absolute privilege against self-incrimination.80
Historically, the absolute right against self-incrimination arose per-
haps as an ad hoc reaction to a particular evil of the seventeenth cen-
tury, the Star Chamber with its oath ex officio, perhaps as the product
of a more reasoned consideration of a particular institution, the trial.8T
But the privilege was limited to formal judicial proceedings,88 and for
good reason. By extending to the defendant the absolute right to
remain silent, it imposes a heavy burden on the state to prove the
guilt of the accused. But since the state can at the trial rest upon the
fruits of its investigation of the crime, the burden has proved tolerable.
The Fourth Amendment has historically controlled the investiga-
tory process. It too protects the privacy and dignity of the individual;
but since the state to bear its burden at the trial must be able to collect
evidence beforehand, the protection offered is more limited: the police
85. United States v. Grunewald, 283 F.2d 556, 581-82 (2d Cir. 1956).
86. The analyses attempted by the Court, as in Schmerber v. California, 384 US.
757, 763-65 (1966), have wallowed, ultimately, in the ancient mind-body distinction. The
difficulty of drawing the line, once the easy cases are left behind, suggests that the at-
tempt itself is rooted in no clear purpose.
87. See generally 8 WVIGNTORE § 2250; Fortas, The Fifth Amendment, 25 CLm. B.
Ass'N J. 91 (1954); Morgan, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 34 MzNN. L. Rv.
1 (1949). The leading proponent of the self-incrimination privilege as a mindless over-
reaction to the Star Chamber was, of course, Bentham:
In a state of things like this, what could be more natural than that, by a people
infants as yet in reason, giants in passion, ever, distinguishable feature of a system
of procedure directed to such ends should be condemned in the lump, should be
involved in one undistinguishing mass of odium and abhorrence....
J. BENTHAAr, RATiONAE OF JUcIAL Ei 'Ca (1827), in 7 Tm: WOPa r J~tE" B,-
TaAm 456 (Bowring ed. 1843). Whether the appearance, and acceptance by the courts,
of the claim that no man was bound to incriminate himself in any court was a constous
and rational advance in the law or, as ]entham would have it, a product of confusion
and aroused passions seems largely a function of the scholar's fondnes for the privilege.
Whichever the case-if indeed a choice between the two anal)ss can or need be made-
the development of the rule during the political and religious upheavals of mid-even-
teenth-century England is perhaps the best commentary on it. The proposition that the
accused may stand mute and "put the state to its proof," or, as Mr. Justice Fortas wrote
before his appointment to the bench, that "a man may be punished, even put to death
by the state, but.. .he should not be made to prostrate himslf before its majesty,"
25 C.ay. B. ASS'N J. at 100, is expressive of an overriding concern for the dignity of the
individual.
88. Indeed, not until 1848 was the accused in England assured protection of his
right to remain silent even at a preliminary hearing. See Morgan, supra note 87, at 14.
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may, when they have probable cause to suspect an individual, search
him and his home.
In extending the absolute self-incrimination privilege to the police
station the Court in effect adopted a functional conception of the
difference between "trial" and "investigation." The interrogation
chamber, like the court room, houses a highly institutionalized stage
of law enforcement. By the time the suspect is brought there, the
investigation has, as Escobedo put it, "focused" on him; it is as "the
accused" that he confronts the state and its officials. Police station
confessions are disfavored, therefore, not simply because they may
decisively affect the trial. Their function so resembles a trial as to
generate the same concerns which originally produced the privilege. 89
Taken seriously, this functional approach leads to quite startling
results. For example, considerations drawn from Escobedo's emphasis
on "focus" underlay Jimmy Hoffa's claim that the Constitution con-
fers a right to arrest.90 At an early stage in Partin's "investigation," he
argued, the Government could present probable cause for his arrest,
and therefore he had a constitutional right to be arrested and allowed
the protection of counsel. The Court boggled at the novelty of this
claim."' But its surprise was unwarranted. Hoffa's lawyers had simply
chosen inartistic phrasing for an argument substantially drawn from
the Court's own opinions: when suspicion had focused on Hoffa the
general investigation was functionally complete; at that point, he was
the accused and thereby entitled to the absolute protection of the
privilege against self-incrimination.
Even if Hoffa had made his point in a less startling fashion, how-
ever, his chance for success would have been slight. In Miranda the
Court had already retired its functional terminology, and carefully
emphasized that the line was to be drawn mechanically at the point
when the suspect was taken into custody. It would be all but impossi-
ble to determine the point outside the police station at which suspicion
has been focused on a single individual. The point at which an accused
is taken into custody, however, can be judicially determined with
reasonable certainty. Thus, the Court modified its functional extension
of the Fifth Amendment in the interests of administrative convenience.
Practical considerations may thus ultimately justify the result
reached in Hoffa on the Fifth Amendment issue. But the fact that a
89. Cf. Morgan, supra note 87, at 27-28.
90. See note 33 supra.
91. Hoffa v. United States, 385 US. 293, 310 (1966).
1008
Vol. 76: 994, 1967
Secret Agents
purely functional view would extend the privilege to many targets
of the secret agent suggests the need for an alternative means of pro-
tecting their privacy.
Secret Agents and the Fourth Amendment
The Supreme Court rejected Hoffa's Fourth Amendment claim
because he "was not relying on the security of the hotel room; he
was relying on his misplaced confidence that Partin would not reveal
his wrongdoing." 92 The Court seems to have adopted the analysis
advanced by the Government brief:9 3
(1) the incriminating statements overheard by Partin could have
been made anywhere, and bore no logical relationship to the "fortu-
itous" fact that they were actually made in a constitutionally protected
area;
(2) therefore the issue of a constitutionally protected area was an
irrelevancy;
(8) and since the risk that statements made to others will be re-
peated "is probably inherent in the conditions of human society,"01
no constitutional issue remained.
The holding that Hoffa like everyone else took the chance his words
would be repeated to the police is a novel application of an "assump-
tion of the risk" notion which first appeared in Mr. Justice Brennan's
dissent in Lopez v. United States.95 Lopez involved the admissibility
of recordings made with a Minifon device carried in an Internal
Revenue Agent's pocket during conversations with the defendant. The
Court held the recordings admissible. Brennan chose the occasion for
a philippic against the evils of electronic surveillance; he argued that
a subject cannot "control" the risk of bugging and wiretapping, where-
as with a little circumspection he can avoid---and therefore he held
to assume-the risk of mere human informing and spying:
For there is a qualitative difference between electronic sur-
veillance, whether the agents conceal the devices on their persons
or in the walls or under beds, and conventional police stratagems
such as eavesdropping and disguise. The latter do not so seriously
92. Id. at 302.
93. Compare id. at 301-05 with Brief for the United States at 124-32.
94. 385 US. at 303, quoting from Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 46.5 (1963)
(dissenting opinion of Brennan, J.).
95. 873 US. 427, 446 (1963) (dissenting opinion of Brennan, J., with Douglas and
Goldberg, JJ.).
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intrude upon the right of privacy. The risk of being overheard
by an eavesdropper or betrayed by an informer or deceived as
to the identity of one with whom one deals is probably inherent
in the conditions of human society. It is the kind of risk we neces-
sarily assume whenever we speak. But as soon as electronic sur-
veillance comes into play, the risk changes crucially. There is no
security from that kind of eavesdropping, no way of mitigating
the risk, and so not even a residuum of true privacy. 0
Though rejected by the Court in Lopez, Brennan's dichotomy be-
tween bugging and secret agents became in Hoffa the basis of the
Court's decision that secret agents do not threaten privacy enough to
merit Fourth Amendment limitation. But it is difficult to accept, at
least without explanation, the assertion that the chance a confidant
may be reporting to the police "is not an undue risk to ask persons
to assume. '"9 Consider, for example, the likely reactions of the citizenry
if asked to rank the offensiveness of three practices:
(1) the police will be allowed to search your home, without force
during daylight hours;
(2) the police will be allowed to offer your friends very strong in-
ducements to report to them any illegal activities on your part;
(3) the police will be allowed to employ agents, who may be
strangers, business associates or friends, to invite or encourage you to
take part in a criminal venture.
The clear state of the constitutional law after Hoffa and its com-
panion cases is that (1) represents an invasion of privacy abhorrent
to the American way of life, but (2) and (3) are quite proper. 8 The
average citizen would hardly agree. For the law-breaker, or even the
average person who realistically considers himself subject to tempta-
tion, (2) or (3) would prove at least as inconvenient as (1). And the
law, of course, claims to protect the guilty as well as the innocent. But
even if only the God-fearing are considered, those who have never
broken the law and are convinced they never will, there seem at best
marginal differences among the three. The actual inconvenience of a
police search, conducted politely at a reasonable hour, is relatively
slight. The assault on the personality lies mainly in the fact that the
96. Id. at 465-66.
97. Id. at 450.
98. A qualification is the entrapment defense, which must be considered in conjunc.
tion with practice (3) but does not actually limit it: under the conventional doctrine,
the police spy may not only invite the target to commit a crime, but may actually en-
courage him provided that a jury later decides that the intent to commit the offense
in some sense originated with the defendant. See note 6 supra.
1010
Vol. 76: 994, 1967
Secret Agents
police have chosen the individual for testing and investigation, and
that the individual must consider himself subject to such scrutiny at
the whim of the police. But this is precisely the same sort of intrusion
as that represented by undercover investigation and solicitation. The
use of secret agents, indeed, has the additional odious characteristic
that the target does not even know that he is ringed by the state, his
reactions probed and his words marked.
The test, of course, cannot be simply the degree to which the indi-
vidual feels "inconvenienced" by a given police practice. Many men,
not otherwise corrupt, would find convenient a constitutional right
to offer bribes to highway patrolmen without fear that their words
could be turned upon them. But there are situations where a man
should be allowed to speak freely; where he should be able to talk
with the confidence that the state is not listening; in short, where his
right to be left alone requires constitutional shelter.
In sorting out the situations in which the individual has good reason
to take umbrage if the state has stationed an observer, the relevant
variables are where the conversation is carried on; to whom the indi-
vidual is speaking; and the circumstances leading to the conversation.
Thus, in the Lewis case99 the incriminating statements and transactions
occurred in the petitioner's home, but the location was fortuitous. The
deception, such as it was, occurred when the secret agent called Lewis
and passed himself off as a narcotics purchaser. The agent then entered
the petitioner's home in this false role, but on the invitation of Lewis.
The Court in Lewis perceived the significance of these factors, but
inartistically dismissed the Fourth Amendment claim because the
"home" had been converted to a "commercial center" when it was
used for an unlawful "business transaction. 10 0 The Court was led
to this inapt phrasing when it focused not on evaluating the deception
practiced, but simply on skirting the problem of a protected area.10'
In Hoffa, on the other hand, the majority not only expressed its con-
clusions poorly but also failed to perceive the quality of the deception
under review. The Court concluded that since Hoffa "was relying
upon his misplaced confidence that Partin would not reveal his wrong-
doing," 102 and since he might have mistakenly trusted Partin anywhere,
99. Lewis v. United States, 585 U.S. 206 (1966). See p. 999 & notes 42-46 supra.
100. 385 U.S. at 211.
101. Air. justice Douglas, dissenting in Lewis, perceived the open-endedncs of the
Court's language but did not attempt to evaluate the quality o deception practiced
on the facts of the case. See 385 U.S. at 346-47.
102. 385 U.S. at 302.
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the fact that the deception occurred in a constitutionally protected
area was an irrelevancy.
This analysis oversimplifies the nature of Hoffa's "misplaced con-
fidence" and in doing so mistakenly rejects the privacy of the hotel
room as a relevant factor. Partin did not just happen to be in Hoffa's
hotel room, nor did the incriminating statements just happen to be
made there. Partin made an effort to spend as much time as possible
in the suite, and the government not only encouraged him to do so
but made it possible for him to be in Nashville to do S0.103 Partin and
the government were so interested in his presence in the suite purely
because both realized that Hoffa would there, if anywhere, discuss
the jury with his cronies. The penetration was active and deliberate;
Hoffa's willingness to talk freely there was not merely a consequence
of his "misplaced confidence" in Partin, but also of his assumption
that the government would not attempt to spy on him in the privacy
of his hotel room.
The fragility of the "misplaced confidence" argument, with its im-
plication that Hoffa should have perceived and avoided the risk that
Partin had become an informer, emerges more clearly when the
Gouled case,' 04 cited as good coin in both Hoffa'0 and Lewis, 00 is
considered. There a friend of the defendant entered his office on the
pretense of a social call, and in his absence seized certain papers; the
conviction was reversed. The Court distinguished Gouled in Hoffa on
the ground that the defendant did not intend his visitor to see the
documents, while Hoffa knew that Partin could overhear any in-
criminating statement. While true enough, this distinction does not
show that Hoffa any more than Gouled was chargeable with "mis-
placed confidence," or that he had "assumed a risk" different from
that assumed by Gouled. On the contrary, both men could have
shielded their secrets by precisely the same device: by not trusting
friends. Each man failed to consider the possibility that the police had
enlisted a friend to collect evidence from a place where the state could
not otherwise reach.
In effect, then, the Court has held that the state cannot without
probable cause invade the privacy of the home-unless it tricks the
individual into admitting a secret agent and allowing him to see or
hear incriminating information.
103. See p. 997 supra.
104. Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921).
105. 385 U.S. at 301.
106. 385 U.S. at 209-11.
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More startling, however, is the Court's total disregard for the value
of friendship as an aspect of privacy. Hoffa v. United States did not
even mention that this might be a value comparable to the freedom
to shut one's door on the world. Yet the interests built into the con-
cept of privacy dearly include the freedom to maintain confidential
personal relationships. The Constitution should give some recognition
at least to that interest. The citizen should be able to rely not only
on his home, but also on some other people, without fear that the
police will use them to monitor his words and activities.
A third aspect of the activities of the secret agent, in addition to
the locale of his work and his relationship to the target individual, is
the active or passive nature of his tactics. Thus, if the individual talks
to a stranger whom he has no reason to trust in a public area, it does
not seem an "undue risk" for him to assume that the listener may be
an informer. A different question is presented, however, if the same
stranger, still in a public place, actively solicits the individual to
commit a crime. This point, of course, is closely related to the entrap-
ment defense,10 7 except that the conventional doctrine places no signifi-
cant limitation on the freedom of the police to choose a target. Thus,
the government had no reason to suspect that Osborn would rise to
dangled bait. Yet such target selection by hunch or by hope is not
improper under the entrapment doctrine if the defendant readily
acquiesces in the invitation to crime. 08
But in ratifying the initial decision of the police to test the pre-
disposition, will-power or financial need of the target, the courts have
rejected the interest of the individual in being left alone by the state
until some justification has arisen. The problem is analogous to that
of a search, where the state has never been allowed to justify its
invasion by the results. 0 9
The Supreme Court's reluctance to scrutinize the tactics of spies
and informers opens limitless vistas for governmental assaults on the
private life of the individual. Its caution probably reflects conviction
of the need for secret agents, and of the difficulty of limiting their
activities without eliminating their role altogether. But administrative
hardship does not require total abstention. Workable devices can be
created for judicial control of secret agents.
107. See p. 994-95 g: notes 4-7 supra.
108. See note 6 supra. And the determination of that question, on the inevitably
conflicting testimony of solictor and solicitee, is an issue for the jury. Cf. Osborn v.
United States, 385 U.S. 206, 331-32.
109. See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 333 US. 10, 16-17 (1948).
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Judicial Controls for the Secret Agent
In trying to place Fourth Amendment controls on the activities of
the secret agent, courts will face a task immensely complicated by the
variety of situations in which spies and informers appear. Moreover,
no great degree of cynicism is needed to suspect that courts will en-
counter difficulty in learning all that goes on in the world of the
secret agent.
But the frustrations to be expected are outweighed by the potential
benefits. The interests of the individual to be protected are worthy
of preservation. If close questions yield no crisp, satisfying answers,
the clearcut cases can be solved. And experience may provide evidence
useful in the solution of the questions which seem on first impression
so difficult. Indeed, the mere accumulation of knowledge is an impor-
tant goal in an area where so little is known of who actually does what
how frequently to whom. Finally, even the cynic must presume at least
a modicum of good-faith cooperation from law enforcement officers.
The Agency Relationship
The starting point for any system of judicial control of secret agents
is determination of the circumstances in which an informer should be
considered an agent of the police. A private individual may spy on his
friends or enemies for a variety of motives, or evidence of criminal
activity may simply fall into his hands and be reported to the author-
ities. In either case the evidence so acquired has not been tainted by
the improper police conduct toward which the Fourth Amendment
is directed. At the other extreme, the state must obviously be held
responsible for the actions of an official employee or a special agent
directed to collect evidence in a specific case.
Difficult problems arise only with individuals in a floating, ambiv-
alent relationship to the police. These may include a host of informers
who report useful tidbits of information to the police in exchange for
money, tolerance of their own activities, or simply the satisfaction of
serving justice. For such sometime-servants of the state fine distinc-
tions could be constructed from the law of agency to determine their
status in specific situations. The realities of the problem militate
against a judicial willingness to allow the police to wash their hands
of the on-and-off operative, however. First, and most important, the
authorities can be expected to minimize their prior relationship with
such semi-pro spies and informers, and the defendant will have great
difficulty finding out, let alone proving in court the full story. Second,
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to the extent the police have encouraged an operative to collect evi-
dence, theirs should be the responsibility for his actions. The goal is
the control of such tactics, and only the police are in a position to
control the activities of the stool pigeons reporting to them.
The test then should be whether the police had reason believe the
operative was in general collecting whatever information he could, and
not whether the police had authorized his actions in the specific case.
In determining this, past service, past encouragement, and especially
past payments-monetary or otherwise-will be relevant.
The Situations for Control of Secret Agents
The objective of constitutional control is to identify and protect
those places, relationships and circumstances where the state should
not officiously monitor an individual's life or test his will. While a
case-by-case examination could be made to determine whether pro-
tection is warranted under all the circumstances, such an unstructured
approach would lead only to confusion, as the Supreme Court dis-
covered in the state confession cases.110 General rules are desirable;
some can be suggested. The suggestions will parallel those interests
found slighted in Hoffa and its companion cases.
First, the use of spies or informers actively to penetrate a con-
stitutionally protected place should be judicially controlled. It should
be possible to predict with fair certainty when the undercover activity
will reach into such an area; certainly Partin and the government both
knew that evidence against Hoffa had to be gathered primarily in his
hotel room. If a living space is fortuitously invaded-as was true in
Lewis-the burden should be upon the police to show that the pene-
tration was unplanned.
Second, the use as a secret agent of a person enjoying a relationship
of trust with the target individual should be controlled. The prob-
lem here, of course, is that interpersonal relationships stretch from
mere passing acquaintance to marriage. The test should be whether
the victim would have made the incriminating statement except for
the personal relationship."' Thus, Hoffa relied on his close friendship
110. See generally the sources cited in note 53 supra.
111. This test must be limited by at least one qualification, which comes into play
when the target individual knows the agent on a dose personal basis but is dealing
with him in his capactity as an employee of the state; the "informer" is then a "secret"
agent only to the extent he indicates a willingness to engage in criminal activity. An
example would be a numbers operator who attempts to buy protection through his
brother, a police officer. In this context, the defendant should not be allowed to rely
on a claimed relationship of trust. A second apparent qualification should be men-
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with Partin; he would not have let a stranger or a casual acquaintance
lounge about his hotel suite. Osborn, on the other hand, had no reason
to place trust in Vick: while he had hired Vick before for jury investi-
gations, the employer-employee relationship between them had not
ripened into the sort of mutual trust and confidence requiring con-
stitutional protection.
The third situation where spying tactics should be controlled arises
when an active solicitation to crime is to be made toward the target.
This is the Osborn situation, of course, and here contests of credibility
similar to those inevitably present in the entrapment cases can be
expected. But the defendant by this test would not have to show that
the "intent" to engage in criminal conduct was forced upon him, but
merely that a solicitation was made to him without justification; his
"ready complaisance" would not be admissible to justify an overture
to crime made without prior cause.
The Standard for Judicial Control
Fourth Amendment standards should be applied to the first case
for control-deliberate penetration into a protected place. The stan-
dard should be the probable cause required to justify a conventional
search, to which this situation is closely analogous. The usual phras-
ing of this standard-"probable cause exists if the facts and circum-
stances known to the officer warrant a prudent man in believing that
the offense has been committed"112-would, of course, need to be
extended to include a reasonable belief that an offense was about to be
committed or that the target was engaged in a continuing course of
criminal conduct.
A probable cause standard would also be proper for controlling the
use of a spy or informer who occupies a relationship of trust with the
target individual. While the analogy to an ordinary search is not so
clear, these tactics clearly intrude upon the privacy of a close personal
relationship. A standard of probable cause presents the further ad-
vantage of a well-developed judicial test with familiar precedents.
tioned to show that it will not actually affect the analysis. This case arises where the
secret agent is a relative stranger to his target when his activities begin, but ingratiates
himself into a position of trust in the course of his work. This could potentially present
a puzzle, but can be resolved. The test of a position of trust envisages a relationship
which can arise only over a substantial period of time; for a secret agent to be acting
against a target for such a length of time would violate the limits to be placed on the
intensity and duration of undercover activity to be discussed below. See p. 1018 & notes
118-20 infra.
112. Henry v. United States, 861 U.S. 98, 102 (1959); see also Draper v. United States,
358 U.S. 807, 313 (1959); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925).
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Only in the case of active solicitation to crime is probable cause
too exacting a standard. Since the only kind of solicitation not covered
by the first two criteria is that made by a relative stranger in a public
place, the invasion of the individual's privacy is more difficult to define
and may seem almost ephemeral. A typical example would be the use
of a spy to attempt to buy narcotics on a street corner or in a bar. The
assault on the personality of the target lies in the fact that tie state
has selected him to be tested, has scrutinized his will and reactions
without his knowledge or consent. In these limited circumstances,
some such standard as "reasonable suspicion"
113 might be proper.114
The Timing of Judicial Control
Control of police agents will be most effective if it is prior control.
The Supreme Court has long expressed its preference that "those in-
ferences [justifying intrusions upon the privacy of the individual] be
drawn by a neutral and detached" officer of the court rather than by
police officers pressured by their responsibilities to enforce the law.115
A system of prior control would be handicapped at its inception by
the absence of any statutory provisions such as those governing the
issuance of search warrants. The government used considerable in-
genuity in obtaining prior judicial authorization for the use of the
Minifon device in Osborn, however, and the judicial construction of
a warrant system would not be impossible. A statutory framework
would, of course, be desirable.
In exigent circumstances the situation may justify the use of a
secret agent without prior judicial authorization. The Court has re-
113. Cf. Note, 74 YALE L.J. 942, 952 (1965).. "Reasonable suspicion" is admittedly
vague and may introduce another "unruly factor" into the law. The best. albeit in-
elegant, definition would probably be "almost but not quite probable cause." For a
factual situation in which probable cause was lacking but reasonable suspicion would
be present, see Henry v. United States, 261 U.S. 98 (1959). Even with full allowance made
for definitional difficulties, a limited standard such as "reasonable suspicion" would still
serve a valuable function in informing the police both that sone discretion should 1I
exercised in selecting targets for solicitation and that their decisions must either be
authorized before execution or reviewed afterward.
114. If the solicitation were repeatedly made or accompanied by ps)chological pres-
sures, a more serious situation would be presented. This, howvcver, could be dealt with
either by the precedents defining coercion in the confession cases or the criteria gov-
erning the intensity and duration of agent activity to be discussed below. See notes 118-20
infra and accompanying text.
115. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948); see also Ventresca v. United
States, 380 U.S. 102, 106 (1965); Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 615 (1961). But
see Rabinowitz v. United States, 339 U.S. 56, 65-66 (1950). The question whether mag-
istrates in fact make "neutral and detached" decisions or merely rubberstamp the de-
cisions of the police is beyond the scope of this note. Even if the wrrant systen is
markedly imperfect in practice, whatever check it does place on unfettered police dis-
cretion would represent an improvement in the area of secret agents.
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laxed its strong insistence on a search warrant when a suspect is fleeing
or about to take flight, when a moving vehicle is involved, or when
evidence is threatened with removal or destruction.'" Similar excep-
tions would be proper in the context of secret agents when, for exam-
ple, the opportunity to employ an informer arose so abruptly and
needed to be exploited so quickly that recourse to a court was not
feasible. 17 But when the police in marginal circumstances employ
secret agents without prior authorization, the court should view post
hoc justification with a jaundiced eye. To prevent evasion of the
general requirement of prior authorization, the state should bear a
heavier burden to show probable cause when spies are used without
a warrant.
The Intensity and Duration of Undercover Tactics
The judicial control of spies and informers should extend not only
to the decision to employ secret agents but also to their activities once
authorized. This aspect of control corresponds to the Fourth Amend-
ment requirement of specificity as to "the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized." 118 The prohibition against general
warrants"10 and unreasonable searches-in the sense of the intensity
of the search-acquires special importance in the context of spies and
informers. A conventional search, even so intensive a one as that
approved in Harris v. United States, 20 is limited to a single time and
116. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 15 (1948).
117. This might occur when a private citizen who has not been acting as a secret
agent reports evidence to the police; to perfect their case the police may wish the
citizen to continue collecting evidence. In doing so by police request lie will become
a state agent, and if his subsequent activities are in a protected area or directed against
a close personal friend, probable cause will be required. In some cases such justification
may exist, but the tempo of events may preclude obtaining prior judicial authorization.
The more difficult case is when probable cause does not yet exist. The argument can be
made that the police should not be denied the information of a private citizen who
came to them as soon as he came upon or collected a tidbit of information. Had he held
off, he would not have become by contact with the police an agent of the state; as a1
private citizen he could have gathered further evidence from a friend or in a protected
area without probable cause. The judicial response to this argument must be largely
a function of the degree of confidence in the good faith of the police. If such confidence
is present, an exception to the requirement of probable cause may be carved out when
the private citizen initiates his agency relationship with the state. Absent such confi.
dence-whether because of cynicism or simply from a frank realization of the tempta.
tion to which the police would be placed to claim the citizen-spy came to them-no
allowance would be made. A possible middle road would be to place the burden on the
police to show that the citizen initiated his relationship with them. Because of the
great practical difficulty a defendant would face in meeting any such claim put forward
by the police, however, this does not seem a promising approach.
118. U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV.
119. See, e.g., Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476 (1965).
120. 331 U.S. 145 (1947) (five federal officers searched a four-room apartment for five
hours).
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place. The collection of evidence by an undercover agent can span
weeks or even months; Partin gathered information for two months
in the Hoffa hotel suite. The obvious danger is that an undercover
agent may engage not in the detection of a specific crime or course of
criminal activity but in general fishing expeditions. Any such con-
tinuing scrutiny of the activities of the target individual would be an
intolerable invasion of privacy.
Judicial warrants for the use of spies or informers should therefore
describe with particularity the extent and intensity of activities au-
thorized. The police should be required to state concretely the evidence
they expect to obtain and within what period of surveillance. The
permissible period should be limited by the conditions of the case; it
seems unlikely that a general surveillance extending over months, as
was present in Hoffa, would ever be justified. If continued use of spies
or informers is required in an ongoing investigation, the police should
be required to secure authorization periodically by showing that con-
tinuation of their tactics was justified.
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